

BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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Abstract: The article analyses domestic and external drivers of the rise of South–South development cooperation to a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations. It argues that the rise was a consequence of presidential leadership, growing domestic mobilisation, shifts in the global political economy and the prioritisation of South–South development cooperation by traditional donors. It explores the case of the Ministry of Social Development cooperation with Africa, focusing on two experiences—the Bolsa Família and the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme. Although the ministry’s partnership with traditional donors remained constant, there was increased domestic leadership in the food purchase programme. © 2015 UNU-WIDER. *Journal of International Development* published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Political theories on foreign aid have treated it as driven by donors’ diplomatic, economic and/or moral objectives (Morgenthau, 1962; Black, 1968; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). Few of them have explored foreign aid decision-making as resulting from a complex interaction between actors and dynamics inside and outside donor countries. New approaches have started filling such a gap by analysing, for instance,

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the influence of northern donors' domestic institutions, ideas and interests in decision-making on the allocation of aid (Lancaster, 2007). However, there is a need to better understand how domestic drivers operate in the case of emerging donors and how they interact with international actors and dynamics. This article aims at contributing to the literature by analysing domestic and external drivers of the rise of South–South development cooperation to a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations (2003–2006 and 2007–2010).

The term South–South cooperation has been broadly used to refer to practices such as coalitions aimed at enhancing the bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations (Lechini, 2009; Ayllón, 2011), trade and investments (Bobiash, 1992; UNDP, 2011), technological and scientific cooperation (Ohiorhenua & Rath, 2000; Lechini, 2009), regional integration (UNDP, 2011; Ayllón, Ojeda, & Surasky, 2014) and South–South aid (Bobiash, 1992) or South–South development cooperation. The latter is understood as an intersection between international development cooperation and South–South cooperation, encompassing flows of technical cooperation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans among developing countries aimed at tackling primary development problems.¹

It is important to stress, however, that there is no consensus among providers of South–South cooperation on its conceptual and operational definitions. For instance, China adopts the expression 'foreign aid' (China, 2011), accounting for grants given at rates inferior than the ones measured by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Lengyel & Malacalza, 2011). Brazil, on the other hand, adopts the expression 'development cooperation', which accounts for non-disbursable flows only (IPEA, ABC, 2010).

Brazilian contributions to development cooperation multiplied by more than five between 2005 and 2010 (IPEA, ABC, 2010, 2014). Brazil became a reference for traditional donors (international organisations and DAC donors) because of its development trajectory in the 2000s and identification with liberal values defended by the western community and, also, for Brazil's principles of solidarity, demand drivenness, non-conditionality and non-interference in partners' domestic affairs.² At the same time, there has been unprecedented domestic mobilisation and dispute around the country's South–South development cooperation and foreign policy and the role Brazil should play at the global economic and political architecture (Leite, Suyama, Waisbich, & Pomeroy, 2014).

This article argues that South–South development cooperation became a foreign policy priority under the Lula administrations not only as a result of decisions made by traditional foreign policy decision-making institutions in Brazil, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the presidency, but also as a consequence of growing mobilisation and disputes between domestic institutions and interest groups, shifts in the global political economy

¹Defining South–South development cooperation as efforts 'aimed at tackling primary development problems' can be interpreted in different ways, as the decision regarding what constitutes a primary development problem is political and variable. To complicate matters further, separating the idea of South–South development cooperation from the web of relationships of South–South cooperation may give us a very incomplete understanding of interests and mutual gains, as well as the integrative results and impact of initiatives.

²Such principles result mainly from the Brazilian government's self-perceptions as a receiver of cooperation. The discourse on solidarity, however, gained ground since the Workers' Party has been in power from 2003 onwards, but it has also been influenced by the mobilisation of civil society organisations in foreign policy issues (Leite *et al.*, 2014).

and the prioritisation of South–South development cooperation in the agenda of traditional donors.

In order to further develop such an argument, the case of South–South development cooperation between the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS, in Portuguese) and Africa is explored.³ The continent became the top destination of resources allocated under the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC, in Portuguese) since the years that followed the creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, in 1996. Although cooperation in social development did not figure among the leading areas of ABC's sectorial resource allocation, the number of initiatives in that sector has grown in the period 2002–2005 compared with previous periods (Iglesias Puente, 2010), and other resources were mobilised to support specific programmes.

Foreign policy analysis is used as the main theoretical-analytical tool. Foreign policy analysis, a subarea of both international relations and political science, explains 'factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers' (Hudson, 2005: 2), by taking into account, although not exclusively (Salomón & Pinheiro, 2013), an analysis of external and internal drivers to decision-making (Hermann, 1990, cited in Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Milner, 1997; Putnam, 1988). Foreign policy in Brazil is understood to be an increasingly contested field in which various actors mobilise to influence decision-making, thus downplaying the traditional role played by the diplomatic bureaucracy in the country's foreign policy (Pinheiro & Milani, 2013).

In order to analyse domestic actors and dynamics, this paper draws on public policy analysis and, in particular, the policy cycle and policy arena approaches, to unpack the role played by domestic institutions, interests groups, ideas and policy entrepreneurs⁴ in decision-making (Souza, 2006). Additionally, a policy-lending lens is used to shed light on the relation between domestic mobilisation to 'export' policies to other developing countries and political objectives related to strengthening the legitimacy of such policies domestically (Morais, 2011).

To account for the external dynamics, shifts in global political economy and in the aid architecture that influenced Brazilian South–South development cooperation and traditional donors engaged in triangular and multi-stakeholder initiatives with the country will be explored. Drawing from world system theory (Wallerstein, 2004), Brazil is approached as a semi-peripheral country. According to that theory, relations between semi-periphery and periphery tend to be closer in cycles of contraction in the global economy, pressuring semi-peripheral countries, for instance, to look for markets in the periphery as a means to overcome decreased commercial access to central economies (Carlsson, 1982). That does not mean, however, that relations between semi-periphery and periphery will necessarily reproduce centre–periphery logic, as middle powers tend to develop multiple and apparently conflicting strategies resulting from their heterogeneous domestic, social and economic structure and from 'cross-purposes resulting from the diversity of objectives and interests at stake in the international system and from the imbalance in their [Middle powers'] power resources' (Lima, 1990: 11).

³Although initiatives involving MDS analysed in this article are mainly focused on technical cooperation—that is, the sharing of experiences and public policies with Africa—the authors chose to use the term 'South–South development cooperation', as Brazilian technical cooperation is intertwined with other modalities, such as contributions to international organisations, financial cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

⁴Policy entrepreneurs are individuals, organisations or networks that seek to initiate dynamic policy change (Mintrom apud Stone, 2001).

Lastly, the article takes into consideration that the international development cooperation field has been dependent on a 'political market' (Milhorange, 2013) for solutions that have been dominated by traditional donors (King & McGrath, 2004). Decisions on which solutions will be chosen depend simply not only on their effectiveness but also on the distribution of power in the international system in a given moment and its impact on global governance structures. International organisations and other donors are understood as bureaucracies that tend to find new strategies when solutions previously defended by them are questioned, thus guaranteeing their existence (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

The article is structured in three sections. The first section maps the dynamics leading to the rise of South–South development cooperation and analyses Brazil's trajectory in particular. The second section explores how South–South development cooperation involving MDS and African countries has shifted, both thematically and in terms of its strategies. The conclusion summarises the article's findings and suggests areas for future research.

2 CONTEXTUALISING BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC TRAJECTORIES

After having experienced a phase of demobilisation in the 1980s and 1990s (Lechini, 2006; Morais, 2009), South–South cooperation has re-emerged in the 2000s as a multifaceted force in international relations, and South–South development cooperation gained renewed prominence in the global agenda. This section maps internal and external dynamics that have influenced such prominence and analyses Brazil's trajectory in South–South development cooperation, contextualising the priority given to this area under the Lula administrations.

The emergence of progressive governments in several southern countries, Brazil among them, has led to the reinstatement of the role of the state in development (Morais, 2009). As a result, policies targeted at social inclusion were launched in many countries, and in some cases, their exportation to other developing countries was used as an instrument to increase their legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011). Economic and geopolitical objectives are also stressed by the literature as drivers of emerging donors' engagement in South–South development cooperation (Ecosoc, 2008; Rowlands, 2008), converging with what has been pointed by analysts as a more pragmatic character of South–South cooperation (Lima, 2008; Abdenur, 2009; Ayllón, 2011).

Traditional donors also prioritised support to South–South development cooperation in a context characterised by efforts to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development cooperation, in response to criticism by southern governments and social movements regarding the impact of neoliberal conditionality-based policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s (structural adjustment programmes, in particular). South–South 'knowledge exchange' became a means to promote social development policies and an allegedly more horizontal environment in development cooperation. For instance, in 1999, the World Bank created the Global Development Network, aimed at fostering the transfer of 'best practices' between developing countries (Morais, 2009).

The international context was also characterised by a 'revolution' brought about by the emergence of new actors, especially China, in development cooperation (Woods, 2008; Severino & Ray, 2009). Focused on infrastructure, Chinese cooperation challenged values

traditionally held by western donors and, consequently, their priorities, advice and prescriptions (Humphrey & Messner, 2006).⁵ At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 2011), the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness incorporated a new focus on the role of the private sector and economic growth in development, shifting the agenda from official development assistance to development finance (Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2013).

That was the general context in which South–South development cooperation gained prominence in Brazil. Nonetheless, it is also necessary to analyse it as part of the country's particular trajectory. Brazil's involvement in South–South development cooperation dates back to late 1960s and early 1970s (Cervo, 1994; Valler Filho, 2007; Vaz & Inoue, 2008). Backed by political and economic purposes designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁶ Brazilian involvement in South–South development cooperation did not emanate from particular strategies designed by implementing agencies but was mediated by traditional donors that had provided them with cooperation, thus replicating received cooperation in third countries (Leite, 2013).⁷

In the first half of the 1980s, in a context marked by economic crisis, access to developed countries' knowledge and technology becomes a priority. However, Brazil continued to provide cooperation mainly with the financial support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (Iglesias Puente, 2010). The persistence of such initiatives resulted from a knock-on effect of Brazilian diplomatic activism in the 1970s, increasing participation of domestic implementing institutions in international spaces and growing international diffusion of their experiences, and advances in the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.⁸ The repercussions of the global economic crisis in Brazil would compel its government to confer a renewed focus to South–South cooperation (Valler Filho, 2007) and to its relations with peripheral countries.

In 1996, 22 middle-income countries, including Brazil, were elevated by the United Nations High Committee on South–South cooperation as pivot countries in South–South development cooperation. As a Brazilian diplomat has put it, 'those emerging and "graduated" countries (...) were assigned with a new role: being the protagonists of South–South cooperation' (Iglesias Puente, 2010: 83).

The strategic character of the involvement in South–South development cooperation, in both domestic decision-making and implementing agencies, became more visible

⁵The prominence of ideas focused on the social dimensions of development, which emerged in the 1970s with the basic human needs approach (Lancaster, 2007), was strengthened with the launching of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000s. The emergence of different approaches does result not only from technical decisions based on lessons learnt but also from the mobilisation and feasibility of solutions proposed by a growing number of official and non-governmental organisations engaged in international development in a context marked by opposition from political coalitions at home to foreign aid (which tend to grow stronger in periods marked by economic downturns).

⁶Valler Filho states that '... Brazilian diplomacy started using international cooperation actions driven by political motives in order to guarantee and disseminate the country's image not only in Latin America, but also with an emphasis on the new African frontier, due to the independence process in former colonies. (...) the cooperation provided would be an instrument of foreign policy aimed at both political and economic objectives. Brazil was asserted as an emerging power, closely linked to export promotion and the opening of markets for Brazilian consultants and equipment' (Valler Filho, 2007: 68).

⁷Diplomats leading ABC were conscious of such dynamics and argued with UNDP that the best national experiences to be shared with other countries were not the ones that received development cooperation but the ones Brazil 'has developed by its own means, with or without the support from developed countries' (Ferreira Dutra apud Iglesias Puente, 2010: 329–330).

⁸The Buenos Aires Plan of Action resulted from the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (Buenos Aires, 1978).

under the Lula administrations. The agenda gained unprecedented attention from the presidency,⁹ as well as from several government agencies and civil society organisations pressuring for transparency and participation in foreign policy decision-making and the allocation of South–South development cooperation. Implementing agencies started assuming a proactive role in diffusing their experience and in the creation of demand by partners (Iglesias Puente, 2010). Therefore, domestic drivers to Brazilian South–South development cooperation started having a bigger influence than in previous periods.

Brazil's provision of development cooperation also started to be measured and classified in different modalities: technical, scientific and technological, educational, humanitarian and financial contributions to multilateral organisations (IPEA, ABC, 2010). Each of these modalities involves overlapping and, in some cases, opaque, institutional frameworks. For instance, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, technical cooperation is coordinated by ABC, but the General Coordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFOME, in Portuguese) is also involved in that modality. Other ministries and official agencies also started allocating part of their own budget to technical cooperation.

It is important to note that the increasing role of Brazil in South–South development cooperation was not accompanied by institutional reforms, such as the design of a national legal framework to support it. A Brazilian diplomat has pointed out that

[...] there is no legal norm that clearly defines distinctions between financial cooperation and technical cooperation [...] and that unequivocally establishes its scope, principles, aims, instruments of action, delimitation of competencies and inter-ministerial or inter-institutional coordination mechanisms [...] (Iglesias Puente, 2010: 135).

In the face of constraints imposed by national laws concerning public procurement, budgetary execution and payments abroad, technical cooperation initiatives have relied on international organizations and traditional donors for their operationalization.

Focusing analysis in particular sectors and geographic regions helps to shed more light on how the interaction among domestic and external dynamics has influenced the profile of Brazilian cooperation. In the case of South–South development cooperation in social development, Iglesias Puente (2010) notes that it was mainly implemented by Brazilian non-governmental organisations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administrations (1995–1998 and 1999–2002). In a context marked by the elevation of the *Bolsa Escola* programme¹⁰ to 'best practice' by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and UNDP (Morais, 2009), the Brazilian non-governmental organisation *Missão Criança* supported the creation of similar programmes in Latin American and Africa.

While domestic coalitions supporting *Bolsa Escola* and minimum income programmes have used the promotion of their ideas abroad as an instrument to earn legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011), the role of the presidency was less visible. Cardoso's diplomatic speeches rarely mentioned South–South development cooperation, despite the rise in the number of

⁹Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) emphasise that South–South relations were part of Lula's foreign strategy of searching for autonomy through diversification of partnerships.

¹⁰*Bolsa Escola* was a cash transfer programme conditional on school attendance. It was implemented in two Brazilian cities in 1995 (Campinas and Brasília) and became a national programme in 2001.

cooperation actions during his administrations (Iglesias Puente, 2010); in such cases, social development was among the issues raised.¹¹

Even though relations with Africa were not a priority during Cardoso's administrations, the continent was already an important part of ABC's portfolio. In terms of the number of initiatives, Africa ranked second in 1995–1996, and although it fell to third place in 1997–2001, it led in terms of resources allocated (Iglesias Puente, 2010). The creation of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in 1996 has contributed to that prominence, as it opened spaces for the diffusion of Brazilian experiences in Portuguese-speaking African countries (Leite *et al.*, 2014).

Brazil's turn to Africa, beyond the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, was announced during Lula's presidential campaign (Saraiva, 2002) and promptly consolidated in his administration's first months with the celebration of the Brazil–Africa forum. Domestically, the Afro-descendent coalition in Brazil grew stronger (Patriota, 2011), and the 'culturalist discourse' re-emerged,¹² emphasising not only the relevance of African culture to Brazilian society but also the country's debt to Africa because of its history of slavery.¹³ Brazilian shift to Africa also happened in a context characterised by China's increased economic presence in the continent.¹⁴

Closer relations with Africa can be verified in the number of presidential visits to the continent; while Cardoso visited only two African countries, Lula has visited 23 (Brun & Muxagato, 2012). Trade between Africa and Brazil increased by almost 234 per cent (Brun & Muxagato, 2012), and Brazilian direct investment in the continent jumped from US\$69million in 2011 to US\$214billion in 2009 (WB, IPEA, 2011). Resource allocation to technical cooperation in Africa implemented under ABC's coordination rose from around US\$525thousand in 2003 to more than US\$22million in 2010, with a significant increase after 2008 (Brasil, 2011). The diverse profile of Brazil's engagement with Africa was analysed by Saraiva (2012) as resulting from a balance between idealism and realism. It also converges with theories on middle powers' foreign policy and on the role South–South relations played in satisfying contradictory demands from Brazilian society (Westhuizen, 2013).

Besides focusing on Africa, Lula proactively raised social issues in international *fora* during his presidency. In 2003, he argued in Davos for increased aid to tackle hunger, and in 2004, he was one of the leaders in the launching of the 'Global Action Against Hunger and Poverty'. At that same year, the CGFOME was created under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the 'international interface of the [national] Zero Hunger Program', coordinating 'Brazilian foreign policy in food and nutritional security, rural development and international humanitarian cooperation' (MRE, 2013).

As the next section will show, at that time, there was an intense debate among different coalitions in Brazil on which policies would be more effective in fighting hunger. Traditional donors were important players not only in the implementation of policies

¹¹The areas most frequently mentioned in Cardoso's diplomatic discourses were the fight against human immunodeficiency virus/AIDS, education and environment (Iglesias Puente, 2010).

¹²The 'culturalist discourse' emerged in Brazilian foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, conferring symbolic relevance to Africa for its participation in the construction of Brazil as a nation (Saraiva, 1997).

¹³According to Lechini (2006), the culturalist discourse was dominant among Brazilian official representatives participating in the Brazil–Africa forum in 2003.

¹⁴Former president Jiang Zenin's visit to Africa in 1996, followed by the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Summit in 2000, was emblematic of the economic turn in China–Africa relations (Alden, 2012). Chinese foreign direct investment's stock in Africa arose from US\$56million in 1996 to US\$4.46billion in 2007 (Renard, 2011: 18).

defended by particular coalitions but also in promoting their international diffusion and Brazilian South–South cooperation in social development with Africa.

3 EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC DRIVERS OF BRAZILIAN SOUTH–SOUTH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST HUNGER IN AFRICA

This section explores how South–South development cooperation involving the MDS and African countries has shifted, both thematically and in terms of its strategies.¹⁵ These shifts were internally shaped by the evolution of the social development institutional framework in Brazil and the mobilisation of domestic actors and coalitions around specific agendas. New institutional arrangements have been created, responding both to the legal constraints of Brazilian South–South development cooperation and to the leadership of policy entrepreneurs. What has been observed is the increased protagonism of national actors, even though traditional donors remained as partners.

In Brazil, the promulgation of the Democratic Constitution in 1988 was followed by a process of reorganisation and redefinition of the country's social policies in the 1990s. However, the universalist agenda still remained to be accomplished as structural adjustment policies resulted in sub-financing of social policies (Jaccoud, 2009). After the macroeconomic stabilisation, social financing was recovered with a stronger focus on poverty (Vaitsman *et al.*, 2006). A new cycle of social assistance started in the 2000s with the promulgation of laws and norms, the creation of coordinating agencies and increased resources invested in social programmes. MDS was created in 2004 to integrate and streamline national social development policies, including programmes on social assistance, food and nutritional security, and cash transfers.

At that time, there was an intense debate among different coalitions regarding which should be the central component of social protection policies. The food security coalition, integrated by civil society organisations ahead of the Zero Hunger programme and MDS' Department of Food and Nutritional Security, claimed that the major issue to be tackled was food and nutritional security and initially pointed to the limitations of cash transfers to empower people (Morais, 2011). A World Bank representative opposed such a perspective in a 2003 Zero Hunger seminar, claiming that cash transfers were more effective in fighting poverty than food stamps (Patu, 2013). The World Bank's view had the support of top leadership from the Ministry of Economy (Patu, 2013). In 2004, the *Bolsa Família* Programme was established in Brazil, unifying previous cash transfer initiatives and allowing them to achieve national coverage.¹⁶

The Zero Hunger programme was revised 10 months after its launch as a broader initiative to include *Bolsa Família*. At this point, Zero Hunger had in its core three

¹⁵ Apart from literature review, this section is based on 13 interviews with relevant stakeholders from MDS, the International Centre for Inclusive Growth, the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger and representatives from African delegations visiting MDS. These interviews took place in 2012 and 2014.

¹⁶ Since MDS' creation, there were three different visions regarding the relation between cash transfers and social development. One focused on the role of cash transfers in social assistance, the second focused on the social expenditure aspect of cash transfers, and the third defended the role of cash transfers in food security (Cotta, 2009, *apud* Morais, 2011). Zero Hunger was supported by the third coalition, which was critical about the emancipatory potentiality of cash transfers but had later accepted it as part of the programme.

programmes that became MDS' main social development 'policy exports' to Africa: the *Bolsa Família*; the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE, in Portuguese), which provides meals in all public, philanthropic and community schools and carries out food and nutritional education actions¹⁷; and the food purchase programme (PAA, in Portuguese), in which family farming products are purchased and distributed to social assistance networks and food-insecure households, as well as to ensure public stocks and price regulation.

The *Bolsa Família* Programme initially became the flagship of Brazilian South–South cooperation in social development. The Africa–Brazil Programme on Social Development, supported by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and the International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth,¹⁸ was launched during a study tour in 2006 that gathered delegations from six African countries to exchange experiences in cash transfer. The exchange led to the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty project in Ghana. Financed by DFID, the project influenced the development of Ghana's National Social Protection Strategy, which had cash transfer as its main component (Souza, 2007).¹⁹ The International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth supported the project by gathering programme documentation, providing administrative support and acting as an advisory partner that informed MDS staff about Ghana's social and governmental realities. The centre's role as mediator was later evaluated as crucial to keeping partners informed about each other's context (Souza, 2007).

Despite the role played by Lula's presidential diplomacy in catalysing the signing of international agreements in cooperation in social development, *Bolsa Família* had rapidly become politically strong in Brazil, thus not necessarily needing international recognition to gain domestic legitimacy at home (Morais, 2011). Brazilian South–South development cooperation in cash transfers happened in a context marked by the global diffusion of cash transfers programmes intermediated by international organisations, mainly the World Bank and the IADB (Morais, 2011; Sugiyama, 2011; Gonnert & Hurtado, 2012). The promotion of *Bolsa Família* abroad is seen as having been driven by requests that arose exponentially because of the programme's allegedly proven success, rich documentation in international literature and its dissemination by international organisations. The fact that the creation of *Bolsa Família* in Brazil was supported, technically and financially, by the World Bank and DFID also contributed to such dissemination. Both institutions invested in documentation and sponsored events where Brazilian representatives presented the experience (Morais, 2011; Gonnert & Hurtado, 2012).

But domestic and external drivers to Brazilian South–South development cooperation in social development with Africa have shifted later on. On the one hand, resulting from

¹⁷In 2009, under the Zero Hunger programme, a law was sanctioned ratifying that 30 per cent of PNAE's budget should be spent buying food from family farming.

¹⁸Established in 2004 as a global centre by UNDP in partnership with the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic and the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research, the centre has the mandate to 'promote the production and dissemination of studies and policy recommendations, the exchange of best practices in development initiatives and the expansion of South–South Cooperation' (IPC, 2014).

¹⁹After the project, the partnership with DFID continued through the involvement of MDS' representatives in regional events, the realisation of another study tour of African delegations and the launching of the programme's webpage. MDS' participation in those events, initially thought of as a means of technical assistance, was later valued as an advocacy tool, grounding cooperation in high-level political alliances (Andrade, 2008).

strong mobilisation of the food and nutritional security coalition, under the National Food Security Council (CONSEA),²⁰ the network of social protection was progressively expanded to include Food and Nutritional Security at its core (MDS, 2008). In 2010, the right to food was included in the Brazilian constitution. On the other hand, after its first experiences in Africa, the *Bolsa Família* team, acknowledging that the African context differs greatly from the Brazilian one and that international organisations were already highly invested in promoting cash transfer initiatives, decided to deprioritize its direct engagement with Africa (Morais, 2011).

The global context also started shifting with the re-emergence of food security at the top of the international agenda with the 2007/2008 food crisis, catalysed by the increase of commodity prices and projections of population growth (Patriota & Pierri, 2013). In Africa, there was a reprioritisation of agriculture's role in the continent's development (Milhorance, 2013). There was also a growing dissatisfaction in Africa with the dominance of cooperation in social development by cash transfers programmes, which, despite evidence of positive impacts, are perceived as costly, demanding a complex delivery structure and as dominated by a donor-driven agenda (Devereux & White, 2008).

In 2010, the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight Against Hunger and Rural Development took place in Brasília. The event convened more than 40 African ministers and established agriculture as a priority for cooperation. The conference established the main areas for future dialogue and cooperation, including public food purchase, broader coverage of existing school meal programmes and support to family farming modernisation.

In 2012, already under Dilma Rousseff's first administration (2011–2014), the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme (PAA Africa) was launched with two main objectives: (i) to support innovative local initiatives of food purchase from smallholders for humanitarian food assistance and (ii) to strengthen partnerships and strategies to support long-term solutions for fighting hunger through local food purchase. Five African countries were included in the project (Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal), implemented through a partnership between CGFOME, MDS, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme's (WFP) Centre of Excellence Against Hunger²¹ and DFID.

Although there were not many public evaluations or evidence-based studies translated into different languages, as was the case for *Bolsa Família*, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme relied on policy entrepreneurs that promoted it in different policy circles, building coalitions and links between different partners. The role of José Graziano in advocating for family agriculture and food security agendas from inside FAO and the political mobilisation of CGFOME in Brazil were key determinants for the visibility of the programme. In a manner similar to the *Bolsa Família* framework, FAO and WFP were working as 'disseminating' agencies for the programme. In this case, however, the key leaders in both organisations spearheading this process were Brazilians, originally involved in the Zero Hunger programme's development and implementation.

²⁰CONSEA includes government and civil society and is responsible for the proposition of guidelines in food and nutrition. It has a consultative character and advises the president on policies and guidelines to guarantee the right to food. CONSEA stimulates society's participation in the formulation, execution and follow-up of food and nutrition security policies (Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar, 2013).

²¹The Centre of Excellence Against Hunger was created in 2011 as an initiative of the Ministry of Education partnered and hosted by the WFP, focusing on creating 'a global forum for South–South policy dialogue and learning on school feeding and food and security programmes'.

Drawing on the Brazilian experience, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme also proposed a stronger focus on civil society participation. Social accountability and civil society mobilisation, which are treated as key determinants for the programme's success in Brazil (Chmielewska & Souza, 2011), have been raised as important aspects of its international delivery. CONSEA is actively involved in the programme and has participated in official delegations, receives international delegations for information exchange and participates in the programme's monitoring committee (Observatório Brasil e o Sul, 2014). Among other actors engaged in food and nutritional security in the country, CONSEA is contributing to build a stronger domestic constituency for it. Their involvement in international dialogue and negotiation forums also contributes to a more qualified dialogue with international partners and African counterparts.

The case of the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme highlights a different dynamic of Brazilian South–South development cooperation in social development. Although it relied on international organisations for its implementation, it has a strong leadership of national actors. The programme is funded by the Brazilian government through contributions to international organisations. MDS provides technical support and shares expertise drawn from its domestic food purchase programme, while CGFOME coordinates the programme's partner network and is responsible for formulating policy guidelines in consultation with partners. Learning and knowledge-sharing activities are supported by the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, while DFID helps to design the programme, participates in the steering committee and contributes with funding. FAO contributes with technical expertise in nutrition-related and agricultural production issues; provides seeds, fertiliser and agriculture tools and inputs; and fosters knowledge exchange, support partnerships and inter-institutional dialogue among project stakeholders. The food purchase and delivery are organised by the WFP, linking smallholder farmers to farmers' organisations in order to procure food items for use in school feeding.

4 CONCLUSION

This article argued that the priority conferred to South–South development cooperation in foreign policy under Lula's administrations (2003–2006 and 2007–2010) resulted from a complex interaction between domestic and external drivers. That period was marked by enhanced leadership of the president in South–South development cooperation, as well as by increased mobilisation around the theme from national institutions beyond the Ministry of External Affairs and from interest groups beyond traditional elites. Debates about foreign policy decision-making, development models and the allocation of resources to South–South development cooperation have contributed to the increased importance of domestic actors in Brazilian South–South cooperation decision-making.

That does not mean, however, that external drivers were no longer important. Shifts in the global political economy and in the aid architecture were accompanied by contradictory pressures coming from the loss of legitimacy of neoliberal policy prescriptions, as well as from the rise of China as a leading actor in development cooperation. As bureaucracies, international organisations and other traditional donors tend to shift their agenda as the global distribution of power changes and as models previously defended by them loose legitimacy. Participating in triangular partnerships with southern countries has an important role in helping international organisations and northern donors reconstruct their legitimacy. From the point of view of the DAC, it was

an instrument to strengthen its traditional agenda, concentrated in the social dimensions of development, *vis-à-vis* the increasing appeal of Chinese aid.

By analysing the case of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS) and African countries, it was possible to argue that MDS' initial participation resulted more from external than domestic drivers. It therefore reproduced the historical trajectory of triangular models involving Brazilian implementing agencies, replicating in third countries the bilateral initiatives with traditional donors in which Brazil had previously been a beneficiary.

Domestic and international shifts have contributed to change such dynamics. The *Bolsa Família*'s team de-prioritised its engagement in Africa, and the food security coalition grew strong in Brazil and abroad. Graziano was elected as FAO's director general and acted as a policy entrepreneur in the dissemination of Brazilian experiences in that area. Food security also re-emerged in the global agenda, and Africa reprioritized the role of agriculture in its development. Supported by the same donors that previously focused on triangular initiatives in cash transfers, MDS started implementing the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme. By comparing the *Bolsa Família* and the food purchase experience, it was possible to observe that although partnership with traditional donors remained constant, Brazilian leadership in South–South development cooperation was enhanced because of domestic drivers and actors.

But it is also important to add that the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme was implemented in a context characterised by the impact of the global economic crisis in Brazil and to a renewed priority given during the Rousseff's first administration (2010–2014) to opening new markets for Brazilian products and promoting partnerships in science and technology with developed countries. On the one hand, just as in the first half of the 1980s, presidential diplomacy assumed a very low profile. Nonetheless, despite the de-prioritisation of South–South cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy, the Purchase from Africans for Africa Programme continued to be implemented. On the other hand, backed by the mobilisation of the industry coalition, the focus of Brazilian development cooperation shifted to financial cooperation aimed at opening markets to Brazilian products and satisfying demands from African governments for credit. It was in such a context that another South–South cooperation programme started being negotiated and implemented: the More Food Programme Africa. The offer of this programme, which includes credits to import Brazilian equipment for family farming, has allegedly influenced how African countries voted for FAO's director general (Barbosa, 2011).

This double facet of Brazilian cooperation (financing and capacity building) can be explained by the fact that middle powers receive contradictory domestic pressures and tend to respond to both the expansionist objectives and the search for a more egalitarian international system (Lima, 1990; Westhuizen, 2013). As a country that does not hold as many hard capabilities as great powers, Brazil tries to influence other countries using soft power, including the exportation of national policies (Lima, 2010). South–South relations respond to domestic groups defending both social and economic developments, although the latter tend to be stronger in contexts marked by economic crisis.

It was beyond the scope of this article to consider the domestic drivers in partner countries. Literature on triangular cooperation highlights that one of its main challenges is restricted involvement of beneficiary countries in setting the agenda and elaborating demands (Fordelone, 2009). This article has also not included an assessment of the impact of triangular partnerships in Africa. What was the role of African countries in triangular partnerships involving MDS? Have such partnerships changed the context and approach

of South–South development cooperation? Will the bigger role played by Brazil in triangular partnerships make projects more effective than the ones led by traditional donors? Exploring these questions is essential to better understand the true potential and impact of South–South development cooperation.

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